The Americans lead the way to the South China Sea
As the Pentagon considering permanent naval task force to counter China in the Pacific we sought the views of Professor Peter J. Dean is a strategic studies scholar who specialises in Australian and United States strategy in the Indo-Pacific, the ANZUS Alliance, Australian strategic policy and military operations.
What is really going on and what are the implications for Australia?
The South China Sea is the news again with US Secretary of State Issuing a warning to China on the anniversary of the Court of Arbitration Ruling handed down 5 years ago which did not go in favour of China, why?
What I think Blinken is doing, I mean he’s is just restating, the do actually have a US-Philippino mutual defence pact. His statement saying any armed attack on the Philippines in the South China Sea would invoke the US mutual defence commitments well he is just reaffirming what the treaty that has been there since 1951 and I think the difference is Duturte tried to siddle himself up there a few years ago to the Chinese and he got nothing out of it and previously back in 2016 when the permanent court of arbitration dismissed China’s claims in the South China Sea the Philippino’s themselves weren’t very keen on exerting their sovereignty. I think just about everyone in the West looks back at that time and says there was a missed opportunity with the Scarborough Shoal incident and with this from the Obama Administration when they could have been much bolder and assertive with the Chinese but that’s the wonderful benefit of hindsight and you know, the way China is behaving now under Xi Jinping is still very different to what they were doing back 5 or 6 or 7 years ago. You’ve got some similar things happening in the East China Sea around the Senkaku Islands and there was some debate over that and the US made it very, very clear that any attack by Chinese forces around or on the Senkaku Islands would invoke the US Japan defence treaty. That seemed to be reasonably effective at sending a very clear signal to the Chinese about where the envelope was and I think what Blinken and Biden are starting to do now is using the anniversary to go back and recalibrate their language and commitment around their relationship with the Philippines.
This comes at a time when we hear the Pentagon is considering a permanent naval task force to counter China in the Pacific.
Well the interesting question I would ask in relation to that is well what do you mean? is the 7th fleet, the 5th fleet and the US Pacific fleet not enough? Is this new ships? or is this a new headquarter structure? or and what is it that this is going to do that’s different to what they’ve been doing before.
Well this area comes under US Indo-Pacific command and then under that you have a fleet based in Hawaii and a fleet based in Japan which falls under the broader pacific fleet structure so if they put something else in, what are they doing, are the just reorganising the deck chairs is this new ships and capability they are moving from other parts of the globe to redeploy to operate in this area, that is the thing I am interested in and what will this do differently to what the Pacific fleet has been doing in recent times.
It’s a task force so one would assume it will sit inside the US 7th fleet or their existing structure and it sounds to me like it will be a task force that is permanently based in the South China Sea so what often happens with naval vessels is they are in particular areas because they are on other missions or other activities, they are on transit from one area to the other, so, what it sounds like they are looking at is a structure that would be more significantly focussed on having a permanent presence and permanent organisational structure in that so it’s about coordinating their assets better, heightening their commitment to that particular part of the Pacific Ocean and ensuring they have a much more enduring presence in that part of the Pacific.
What is the specific communication between the US and Australia, and what cooperation intentions and specific measures have been reached between the two countries?
We have embedded Australian officers in various parts of US military forces as they have in with ours and we have regular communications with them but what the US decide to do is a US choice. It will be discussed with us but it’s not up to us to approve or not to approve it’s them to do but I am absolutely sure we would have had an engagement and discussion and knowledge about this but I don’t know the extent to which they have sought our views on this. In the end, the US military make decisions about what the US military want to do but I am absolutely sure that we would have known and there would have been discussion about these plans and these ideas in advance and if nothing else we have a consul general to Indo Pacific command in Hawaii who works very closely with the Americans and we have a number of officers who are embedded into the US forces in Indo Pacific command.
Do you think Australia will want to participate in this task force.
We have almost zero obligations to the Americans and they have zero obligations to us, you know, when you read the alliance treaty we agree to consult on issues of mutual concern on matters in the Pacific that’s as far as it goes, the key question though in a 70-year relationship and an exceptionally close military relationship in alliance, is what are the expectations that the US has for Australia? and how much are we willing to meet those expectations based on our own sovereign interests? So, any request from the Americans we will always consider very seriously but the in the end we will make our own decisions based on our own sovereign interest. Why we do so much together is because we have very common strategic interests here in these matters.
Are there any differences between the two sides? What are they?
Australia has been very consistent in our approach to the South China Sea we are not a claimant in the disputed territory but we are certainly a country that has core interests in the South China Sea and we’ve always had core interests in that part of the region going back since we had a navy from its beginning, the South Pacific and South East Asia have always been our core areas of interest and of course, as a maritime state with one of the largest EEZ’s (exclusive economic zone) in the world, it is absolutely in our interests like rulings like the one from the Permanent Court of Arbitration are the international rules of the road and the international law that is followed and respected by all countries. We’ve been doing operation in the South China Sea going back to the 1970’s, you know, through the 5-power defence agreement for the air defence of Malaysia – what has changed between now and then is Chinese interests, Chinese aggression and Chinese behaviour. We haven’t changed our behaviour, we’ve been there for going on 50 years, what has changed is their presence and their behaviour and their counter claims. So, Australia has been very good at not taking a backward step but also not provoking anyone unnecessarily by escalating things.
Australia has always resisted doing freedom of navigation exercises on these artificial islands and reefs in the South China Sea, I think that’s been a good policy with the Australians. I think that’s been a good policy, as I said we haven’t taken a backward step in the routine operations we’ve been doing in the South China Sea and we have a particularly strong presence up there and have had for a very long period of time but we haven’t wanted to escalate things above and beyond and to be honest you can do all the FONOPS (freedom of navigation operations) you want to do in the world, past these artificial reefs, will it mean the Chinese will stop doing what they are doing? No. So what is it the US thinks these things are really going to achieve? You can exert your emphasis on the arbitration rulings without being unduly provocative. We’ve made it clear diplomatically, we’ve made it clear from our presence in the region but we’ve haven’t wanted to escalate ourselves and put ourselves at increased risk but undertaking activities that we see have very little strategic return.
What is Australia’s specific attitude towards this and how it plans to participate (such as how many troops it will contribute and which naval ports it will provide for its fleet).
Do we decide that this is important and a priority area and do we recalibrate the existing defence assets that we have to be able to achieve that? We have finite resources but the very wise and long overdue shift in the defence strategic update from focus on the Middle East back into South East Asia and the South Pacific, which is core business for us, it’s long overdue and it means for every ship we used to send to the Middle East, you know, you have one ship in the Middle East, one ship coming back from that deployment, one ship preparing to go, that’s 3. We tend to only have between 12 and 14 major ships in our navy so that’s a considerable use of our resources and assets and the opportunity cost of that was always less presence in the South East Asian area, Indian Ocean or Pacific Oceans regions. By stopping send so much to the Middle East and being involved in there it releases our capacity to focus on proper core interests and of course we are seeing an expansion, a slow but steady re-capitalisation of our navy with the biggest no wartime recapitalisation ever in the navy’s history. Now some of it is a long way off but the capabilities we have are very good, we have very good maintenance cycles which keeps these ships in the water and keeps them sailing around and it’s about the government then and the military choosing, prioritising which of these deployments and engagements with our allies in the region that we prioritise. So, if we wanted to get involved in this task force and we saw it was a core strategic interest for us I’m sure the Americans would love to have us and I’m sure that we would make that happen. The question is a policy question about is this the best use of our assets? Is this the best way to do engagement with our allies and have our presence in the region?
When Australia joins the task force, will it purchase more ships? Do you have any specific plans at present?
How we contribute will depend on the nature and style of the task force. From a maritime perspective any of our frigates or air warfare destroyers, even potentially our submarines and our maritime surveillance aircraft and even some of our other air force assets. It depends on the composition of that particular task force. You would assume the burden would mainly fall on the navy if we chose to commit. It’s about opportunity cost, if we put a warship there, it can’t be somewhere else. We’ve done plenty of deployments with the US, we get involved with the Rimpac exercises, the US are heavily involved in the Talisman Sabre exercises that are about to kick off, that we run, this is our largest bilateral exercise with them. We have our own presence in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea on a regular basis and we do exercises with the Indian Navy, with the Singaporeans, with the Malaysians, with the Indonesians on maritime security stuff so, it’s about balancing out where our effort would be.
So, what do we have there now?
Well I couldn’t tell you exactly what we have there, that’s classified, but as I’ve said we’ve had a regular presence particularly in that region that is around surface vessels and ships doing naval diplomacy and of course, air craft assets that contribute towards air surveillance and maritime surveillance in the region but also we’re still committed to the five powers defence agreement and other treaties that go back to the 60’s and 70’s about helping to support the air defence of South East Asia and that’s why we still have a presence at Butterworth in Malaysia, we do a very number of exercises with the Singaporean Military in that region and of course, a slow but steadily expanding relationship with the Indonesian military as well.
If Europe does not intend to participate, will Australia participate on its own?
The thing about the Europeans is they are an even more external power to this than us so the British carrier, Queen Elizabeth is coming out there and Boris Johnson is saying we’re going to do FONOPS and we’re going to go past these reefs and so on, well the Chinese can stand there and make a lot of noise when the British and the Americans do it and then they are going to sail away and they will be lucky to come back in a year’s time. I mean who cares if the British do FONOPS the South China Sea? Britain is thousands of nautical sea miles away, they have no ability to have an ongoing presence in the region and while they have an interest in protecting the global commons and freedom of navigation, British interest are really closer to home in the Atlantic and the North Sea. If I was the Chinese I would simply wave as they went past, complain as they will endlessly about this and then when they’re gone they’re gone and we’ll see them back in a year’s time. The British have no ability to maintain an ongoing presence in the region. It’s different for us and it’s different for the US, and for the Japanese and other parties. The South China Sea or the West Philippines Sea or East Vietnamese Sea depending on who you are speaking to. Those countries are there permanently, the US is going to have a long ongoing presence so will we, so will the Japanese and others so I think the Chinese are much more concerned about our activities that they are about European or British activities in the region. What it could present is a United Front from a number of significant international countries that assert that this is about the international rules of the road. Now as a middle power Australia has always been partnered with the US or Great Britain as a major power and we need to get upset when the Americans do things unilaterally that don’t follow international law because as a middle power the world works much better when it’s not it’s not might is right running the road but when we have some agreed international norms and agreed international rules. Now the Chinese went to the court of arbitration and they lost and they lost big time and they’ve just chosen to ignore that and exert their supposed sovereignty over the region by force and with a country with one of the largest EEZ’s in the world, the ignoring of those rules is extremely perilous for Australia from that immediate position but also more broadly from our position as an international citizen and the way to resolve concerns like this that doesn’t fall into a might is right approach.
We are much closer to the South China Sea and its always going to be core business for us and America is in Hawaii, it’s got much further to go there has been a question about US resistance and US resolve. Under the Obama administration it was less sure and under Trump, who knew? Do you really want to rely on someone like Trump who had complete disdain for his allies, we can have much more confidence in support from the Biden administration, they seem to be taking a much firmer stance which I believe is very positive, but what’s important here is the long term and what’s going to happen here in 10, 20 or 40 years from now? and how much resolve is the US going to have through that period? I think the big issue in the South China Sea, you know the Vietnamese are doing what they can to exert their own sovereign interests and claims, in the past the Philippinos have not been as capable or not as willing, I think what is starting to change, if you go back and look at the Scarborough Shoal incident during the Obama administration and if you look at the way Duturte responded to the Obama administration early on in his regime now if you look at recent Chinese behaviour, the concerns that Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam have about Chinese coercion, I think we are seeing a hardening of those states’ position in a very careful and calculated way and of course you’ve got a much more forward leaning US administration who have openly said it’s a competitive relationship with China and you now have a more competent person in the White house and more surety about what the response will be.
Who is taking the lead in the Australian military?
Peter Dutton clearly wanted to be defence minister, there’s no doubt about it. He’s been much more forward leaning in his posture so far and I think it’s widely accepted in political circles that he has a very strong voice on national security issues in the cabinet room. Morrison has weighed in where he has had to but he’s never really been an internationally focussed politician, he’s been very domestically focused and his attempt to use some of his domestic political tactics in the international sphere have not worked so well at times. It doesn’t mean he’s resolving from any of this and certainly his government has been more forward leaning, don’t forget it was this government that came out with the concerns about the virus and the concerns about Wuhan and the calling for the international commission. They’ve had a forward leaning presence regarding foreign interference in Australia. Also, their decisions on Huwai have also been wise ones and we’ve copped it as a result.
Who pays for this, Are there any other channels besides the government funding?
I wouldn’t think so. When we do stuff with the Americans, even we you go back and look at even the marine rotational force in Darwin that was slow in development and very hard fought because were debating who was going to pay for it. Our deployments are our own, we get support in engagement from the Americans through a lot of things but the Americans don’t pay for our defence, that is something that comes out of our defence budget. These things are not cost neutral, deploying sailors or airmen and women or ground forces into these regions, you know, the cost of deploying them, the cost of maintaining them, additional wages you pay for people who do this type of stuff but that comes out of the budget for the joint operations command and this is about balancing out where our commitments are vis a vis what we want to do in the world and if the government wants to do more well there’s a cost to that whether that’s in people, capability, operation costs or others.
The Australian military port is right next to the Darwin port which has been leased by Chinese companies for 99 years. Will it affect the task force?
I think that is completely overblown. It’s bricks and mortar infrastructure, it’s a port and from a security point of view a Chinese national or a diplomat sitting in a lawn chair with a pair of binoculars outside the wire can pick up just as much of what is going on. This is a commercial port with a commercial focus, the navy doesn’t like using that port anyway, the port of overtaxed from a commercial point of view. On the 5g stuff, absolutely on keeping them outside of other critical infrastructure absolutely but this kind of stuff, look we probably would have viewed in differently now because of the strategic calculational change but let’s not forget the Port of Darwin sale was vetted by the security and intelligence organisations of Australia, the Department of Defence before it happened and largely speaking that type of infrastructure, if any goes to the wall with the Chinese and you really want something, you can nationalise it and take in back in two seconds flat. It’s largely a bricks and mortar infrastructure piece. I think it’s a red herring and I’ve yet to see anything in the public debate to prove otherwise and I think we’ve got a pretty good and confident security intelligence system so unless there is something that has radically changed since the sale and I have not seen anything in the public debate that persuades me that this is a risk to national security. What defence really want up in Darwin is another port built in a bay or two around that has specific military only uses both from a security point of view and a capability point of view and it probably helps their case to get that infrastructure built with the fact that that commercial port is owned by the Chinese.
If a war breaks out across the Taiwan Strait and the taskforce goes to war with China in the future, is the Australian government ready to let the Australian troops in the taskforce go to war with China?
We’ve don’t this before, we have, at times, had HMAS Sydney and other warships based in US carrier task groups operating in the East and South China Seas before on a more temporal basis. There as an incident some years ago when there was some heightened tensions in the East China Sea and I think HMAS Sydney was the point ship on a US carrier battlegroup in the area. What that does is it reduces the amount of warning time our government has or the decision time our government has for us to act on things if we’ve already got vessels in the area. If we’ve already got vessels in the area and something happens and we don’t get involved well that will obviously have potentially a negative impact on our relationship with the US but generally speaking there are long thought through and discussed contingency plans around this. There rules of engagement and understandings about what coalition forces can and can’t do inside other people’s battlegroups and task groups. It might be this task group in the South China Sea is doing a whole bunch of activities that we completely agree with and then if the Americans want to do a FONOP against one of these particular island reefs it would probably detach an American warship to go and do that particular thing, not an Australian one because there would have been a discussion beforehand to say we’re not willing to do that without permission from Canberra and that’s not within our rules of engagement to be undertaking these types of activities.
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